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Elgar)

Contract law provides for the legal enforcement of exchange agreements
and certain other voluntary obligations. Laws of deception, in distinction,
target misrepresentations, failures to disclose, and other forms of duplicity
or deceit.1 There are significant differences between these areas of law.
Most obviously, contract law gives persons the power to undertake new
obligations when they wish, whereas laws of deception typically impose
duties of candor on persons whether they want them or not. Whereas
breach of contract is a strict liability wrong, many laws of deception
condition liability on a showing of fault. And there are differences in
remedies. Contract law does not penalize breach but restricts parties to
compensatory measures, further limited by rules regarding avoidability,
foreseeability and the like. Many laws of deception grant the successful
plaintiff more generously compensation, and sometimes provide for
punitive damages, civil fines, or even criminal punishment.
These and other differences have generated a long-felt need to
police the border between the law of contract and the law of deception,
and especially the line between actions for breach of contract and actions
for the tort of deceit.2 But the regions also overlap. Although legal duties of
candor are typically not chosen, parties can sometimes contract into or out
of those duties. The law of warranties provides ways that sellers can
become strictly liable for falsehoods. And sophisticated parties can
sometimes limit liability for misrepresentations by using a big boy letter or
no-reliance clause.3 Contrariwise, laws of deception can apply, and
1

More specifically, laws of deception are designed to prevent, punish, compensate
for, or otherwise address acts or omissions that wrongfully cause false beliefs in
another. See Gregory Klass, The Law of Deception: A Research Agenda, 89 Colo. L.
Rev. 707, 711-16 (2018).
2
See William Lloyd Prosser, Borderland of Tort and Contract, in Selected Topics on
the Law of Torts, 380 (1953).
3
See Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol Evidence Rule, and Precontractual Misrepresentations, 33 Val. U.L. Rev. 485 (1999); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
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sometimes target, deceptive acts within contractual relationships, including
acts that also qualify as breach. Misrepresentations among contracting
parties can both generate defenses against contract actions and give rise to
noncontractual forms of liability.
This chapter focuses on overlap of the second sort: ways
misrepresentations between contracting parties can affect their legal
relationship, as distinguished from ways parties can contract to alter the
legal effects of their misrepresentations. My thesis is that a successful law of
contract must take account of not only promissory obligations, but also
obligations of candor. If this is correct, the law of deception should not be
viewed as distinct from the law of contract. Contract law incorporates and
relies on laws of deception to achieve its goals.
The list of laws and legal rules that address deceptive acts between
contracting parties is a long one. It includes in the US the misrepresentation
defenses, the law of warranties, equitable estoppel, the torts of deceit and
negligent misrepresentation (the “misrepresentation torts”), state unfair and
deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) statutes and the Federal Trade Act,
criminal fraud, as well as industry specific rules found in employment law,
workplace safety regulations, securities law, and elsewhere. Only the first
two items on the list—contract defenses and the law of warranties—belong
to the law of contract as traditionally conceived. All, however, figure into
the legal ecosystem in which contractual transactions take place.
This chapter argues that when applied to contractual transactions,
laws of deception advance at least three aims of contract law. They ensure
that contractual obligations are voluntarily ones. They create incentives
with respect to sharing information that advance parties’ interests and
expand their options. And they address wrongs constituted in part by the
semantic and moral fields contracts generate. Part One discusses the first
function and the misrepresentation defenses. Parts Two and Three examine
how noncontractual liability for misrepresentation serves the second and
third functions. Parts Two and Three focus on the misrepresentation torts,
though one might extend their conclusions to other laws of deception.
I.

Misrepresentation and Compromised Choice

Contract law is designed to enforce voluntary obligations, which is to say,
obligations that the contracting parties intended to undertake. Familiar
means of acquiring a voluntary obligation include promising a
performance, agreeing to an exchange, and recording a commitment in a
formal document. To say that contractual obligations are voluntary is not to
say that contracting parties intend every aspect of their contract. Default
terms attach in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, and mandatory
Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business Acquisition Agreements
and the Right to Lie, 32 Del. J. Corp. L. 431 (2007).
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terms despite evidence of a contrary intent. And a person who undertakes a
nonlegal obligation to perform might unwittingly incur a corresponding
contractual one, at least in the United States, where contractual liability is
not conditioned on an intent to be bound.4 But these points concern the
reach of contractual obligations, not their origins. What brings a contractual
obligation into existence is one or more voluntary undertaking.
Design follows function. If contract law serves to enforce voluntary
obligations, we should expect it to be designed in a way that ensures the
voluntariness of the undertakings that generate contracts. Joseph Raz makes
this point with respect to the role of formalities in power conferring laws
generally. By conditioning the legal effect on a ceremonial act with no nonlegal meaning—like signing a formal document or reciting certain words—
the law ensures that the power is not exercised by accident.5 Also important
is the quality of choice. Even if a person knows the normative
consequences of their act (Raz’s concern), their choice compromised if it is
made under pressure, if it is not fully informed, or if the actor’s judgment is
impaired. In these circumstances the law might deem the undertaking
insufficiently voluntary, and therefore limit its legal effect. Hence the
procedural defenses of duress, mistake, and incapacity (as distinguished
from substantive defenses, such as illegality).
The misrepresentation defenses are similarly procedural in nature.
The Second Restatement of Contracts identifies several misrepresentation
defenses. If a party’s apparent assent was induced by a misrepresentation as
to the character or essential terms of a proposed contract, the law deems
there to have been no actual assent and therefore no contract.6 If a party’s
assent was justifiably induced by the other’s fraudulent or material
misrepresentation of fact, the resulting contract is voidable by the deceived
party.7 If a party’s assent was justifiably induced by a third-party’s
fraudulent or material misrepresentation, the contract is again voidable,
unless the nondeceived party in good faith and without reason to know of
the misrepresentation has already given value or materially relied.8 Finally,
a party’s justified reliance on the other’s misrepresentation as to the
contents of an integrated writing can support reformation of that writing, so
long as such reformation will not affect the rights of third parties.9 In each of
these cases, a misrepresentation or other deceptive act has rendered the
deceived party’s assent imperfect, and so the law holds that there is no

4

Restatement (Second) of Contract § 21. See Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95
Va. L. Rev. 1437 (2009).
5
Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers (pt. 2), in 46 Proc.
Aristotelian Soc’y 79, 81 (Supp. 1972).
6
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 163.
7
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 164(a).
8
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 164(b).
9
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 166.
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contract, that the resulting contract is voidable by the deceived party, or
that the contract terms are other than those agreed to.
Just how does misrepresentation compromise the deceived party’s
choice? Misrepresentation overlaps with mistake. The deceived party has
based their decision to enter an agreement on a false belief, rendering that
choice defective. But misrepresentation adds something more. The mistake
was caused by another, usually the other party. And if the misrepresentation
was fraudulent, the deceiver has manipulated the deceived. The deceived
party’s choice in such cases is not entirely their own.
One way to think more about what is distinctive about the
misrepresentation defenses is via a comparison to tort law. Just as tort law
serves inter alia to allocate the costs of accidents, the procedural defenses—
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, lack of capacity—provide rules for
allocating the costs of defective contractual undertakings. The cost of a
defective undertaking is that one party is bound to a contract they would
not otherwise have agreed to and now wish to avoid. When the defense is
successful, that cost is avoided by holding the contract void or voidable, or
by reforming it, thereby imposing a new cost on the other side: losing some
or all of the benefit of the planned exchange.
The tort analogy suggests dividing the procedural contract defenses
into two types: strict and fault based. The infancy defense, for example, is
mostly strict.10 A party that raises the defense must show only that they were
under the age of majority, not that the adult party was at fault in the
exchange. The contract is voidable even if the adult was reasonably
ignorant of the minor’s age and took no advantage in the exchange. Duress,
in distinction, is a fault-based defense. A party claiming duress must show
not only that they had no reasonable alternative, but also that the cause was
the other party’s wrongful threat. Being over a barrel is no defense; the
other party must have tied you to it.
The misrepresentation defenses are a curious mix of strict and fault
based. Consider a basic scenario: A has made a materially false statement
of fact, on which B relied when agreeing to transact with A. The defense
requires that A’s misrepresentation caused B’s erroneous belief. A is in this
sense responsible for the defect in the agreement process. The defense does
not, however, require B to show that A was at fault for the defect. A
nonfraudulent, nonnegligent material misrepresentation suffices.11 In this
10

“Mostly strict” because in some U.S. states, the minor who misrepresents their
age cannot make use of the defense. For example: “Infancy is no defense to an
action to recover money advanced to an infant on the basis of his
misrepresentation of majority reasonably relied upon by the lender.” Manasquan
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Mayer, 236 A.2d 407, 408 (N.J. App. Div. 1967).
11
Although section 164 of the Second Restatement provides the misrepresentation
must be fraudulent or material, Farnsworth reports that materiality does all the work
in case outcomes. “[A]lthough there is no shortage of cases allowing avoidance
where the misrepresentation was both material and fraudulent, or material but not
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basic scenario, the misrepresentation defense is strict. A party who makes a
material misrepresentation on which the other relies bears the costs of the
defective agreement, whether they are at fault or not.
But fault is not absent from the misrepresentation defenses. First,
some misrepresentation defenses incorporate fault of the deceiver. In the
absence of a false statement of fact, the defense might be based on
concealment or a failure to disclose. Concealment is an act “intended or
known to be likely to prevent another from learning a fact,”12 and so is by
definition fraudulent and wrongful.13 Nondisclosure gives rise to the
defense only if there was breach of a duty to share the information—
because of a relationship of trust and confidence, because one party knows
that the other has been deceived by their earlier statement, or because a
party know of the other’s mistake and failure to correct it violates
reasonable standards of fair dealing.14 Again wrongfulness is built into the
definition. Both the concealment and the nondisclosure defenses require a
finding of fault.
Second, the misrepresentation defenses consider the potential fault
of the party raising the defense. Even in the basic scenario, the deceived
party’s reliance on the misrepresentation must have been justifiable.15 The
Second Restatement provides that one is generally not justified in relying on
statements of opinion, puffing, bare statements of intention, and statements
of law, and that reliance is unjustified if nondiscovery of the truth “amounts
to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing.”16 The justifiable reliance requirement is
comparable to the older contributory negligence doctrine, in which the
fraudulent, it is difficult to find cases that have done so where the misrepresentation
was fraudulent but not material.” E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts §
4.12 (4th ed. 2004). Practically speaking, “the test for avoidance as distinguished
from recovery of damages in tort, is one of the materiality of the misrepresentation
without regard to whether it is fraudulent.” Id.
12
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 160.
13
For more on the ways concealment incorporates fault, see Gregory Klass,
Meaning, Purpose and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 Geo. L.J. 449, 460-66
(2012).
14
See Restatement (Second) of Contract § 161.
15
The Second Restatement rules generally provide that the reliance must have been
“justifiable.” Mark Gergen has observed that in mid-twentieth-century tort cases,
courts began replacing the justifiable reliance requirement with a reasonable
reliance one, and that this shifted the focus away from the defendant’s bad intent
and to the plaintiff’s fault, thereby failing to protect especially gullible plaintiffs.
Mark P. Gergen, A Wrong Turn in the Law of Deceit, 106 Geo. L.J. 555 (2018).
Gergen’s story begins with the waning of the requirement that a tort defendant
intended the plaintiff’s reliance. Although I know of no systematic study, I would
expect things to be different in the contract defenses, where there is no requirement
that the misrepresentation was fraudulent.
16
Restatement (Second) of Contract § 172.
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victim’s fault provided a complete defense to a claim of negligence. In this
way too fault can figure into determining who will bear the costs of the
defective assent.
The appearance of fault in the misrepresentation defenses is not
difficult to explain. The party at fault for defective consent should bear the
costs of that defect. This simple principle explains, for example, both why a
seller who intentionally conceals a material defect is denied the benefit of
the bargain, and why a buyer who unreasonably relies on mere sales talk is
held to the deal. To be sure, what counts as fault can be difficult to define
and has changed over time, as illustrated by the expansion of disclosure
duties in the twentieth century. But line-drawing difficulties aside, there is a
simple intuitive appeal to using fault to allocate or reallocate the costs of
defective assent.
The strict aspects of the misrepresentation defenses are perhaps
more difficult to explain. Consider again the basic scenario: A
unintentionally and non-negligently makes a materially false statement on
which B justifiably relies when agreeing to the transaction. Although A is
not at fault, B has the power to rescind the resulting contract. One might
venture an economic explanation of this rule: Having chosen to speak, A is
perhaps the least-cost avoider.17 Or the strictness of the defense might be
explained by the moral connection between causation and responsibility.
Causing harm to another can generate a duty to correct the harm, even
when one is not at fault.18 Or maybe the explanation is doctrinal: this is
where the misrepresentation defenses overlap with unilateral mistake.19 Or
perhaps no explanation is required. Something has gone amiss. One party’s
undertaking was less than fully voluntary, generating a cost that someone
must bear. Shifting it to the party whose words caused the error, even if
they are not at fault, is as good a rule as any.

17

See Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 155 (1970) (“[T]he search for the
cheapest avoider of accident costs is the search for that activity which has most
readily available a substitute activity that is substantially safer. It is a search for that
degree of alteration or reduction in activities which will bring about primary
accident cost reduction most cheaply.”).
18
Shelly Kagen, for example, suggests that “[a]ll other things being equal, the
person who harms another has a special obligation to correct the harm, by undoing
it or otherwise compensating the victim.” Shelley Kagan, Causation and
Responsibility, 15 Am. Phil. Q. 293, 293 (1989).
19
In his 1919 treatise on equity, George L. Clark observes: “Since equity will
rescind for mutual mistake as to an intrinsic fact the plaintiff’s case is merely made
stronger if it be shown that the defendant innocently caused the plaintiff's mistake.”
Equity: An Analysis of Modern Equity Problems Designed Primarily for Students
511-12 (E.W. Stephens Publishing 1919).
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II.

Information and Gains of Trade

The above account of the misrepresentation defenses emphasizes the
voluntary nature of contractual obligations. Because contract law gives
legal recognition to voluntary undertakings, the conditions of contractual
validity are structured to ensure that acts that produce contracts are
sufficiently voluntary. Because a preformation misrepresentation can
compromise a party’s choice to enter a contract, the law limits the legal
effects of that choice.
This is not to say that this is all there is to the misrepresentation
defenses. Because parties typically want enforcement, withholding the
benefits of the bargain from those who make material misrepresentations
also encourages precontractual candor, which in the long run benefits
everyone.20 The defenses generate positive incentives. And if the
misrepresentation was wrongful, denying enforcement is justified by ex
turpi causa non oritur actio—from a dishonorable cause no action arises.
There is also a moral dimension to the misrepresentation defenses, as befits
their origin in equity.
That said, these two functions—creating desirable incentives and
addressing wrongful acts—are more directly served by other laws of
deception, such as the torts of deceit and negligent misrepresentation. The
threat of rescission is a weak one, as compared to damage awards. And tort
liability is a common way to signal that a wrong has been committed. This
part and the next consider how these misrepresentation torts interact with
contract law. This part discusses incentives, the next remedying wrongs.
Most contracts govern mutually beneficial exchange agreements.
Suppose S agrees to sell their bicycle to B for $100, and that the parties
agree to this exchange because B values the bicycle at $150, and because S
values it at $75. B stands to gain $50 in value from the exchange, S $25.
The sum of these individual benefits constitutes the gains of trade, or
contractual surplus. At the time of formation, each party must determine for
themselves whether the proposed exchange will benefit them. To make that
determination, a party often needs information about the other’s promised
performance. B must know something about the bicycle to know its value
to B. S, as owner of the bicycle, is likely to possess that information. When
this is so, the cheapest way for B to learn about the bicycle is for S to tell B
what S knows about it. Effective communication, however, requires
credibility. B must trust S to be truthful. Here noncontractual liability for
misrepresentation can play a positive role. By holding S separately liable for
any material misrepresentations, the law gives S a new reason to be truthful
and gives B a new reason to trust S’s statements.
This simple tale is far from the whole story with respect to the
incentives legal liability for misrepresentation can provide in contractual
20

See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1993).
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settings. But it illustrates a core point: in conditions of mistrust, both parties
can benefit from such liability. Just as legal liability for breach can enable
mutually beneficial exchanges that might otherwise fail for lack of trust,
legal liability for misrepresentation can enable information sharing
necessary to make those exchanges happen. Because both parties benefit
from the exchange, both benefit from the forms of legal liability that make it
possible.
One need not be committed to a welfare-maximizing theory of law
to see this as a good thing. Liability for breach gives parties a tool they can
use to engage in shared projects that might otherwise fail for lack of trust.
That tool expands their autonomy by enabling them to engage in new and
valuable projects together. As the above simple story illustrates, legal duties
of candor between contracting parties can do the same. A party’s duty of
candor is not a voluntary obligation in the strong sense that their duty to
perform is. Parties undertake duties to perform, whereas the law imposes on
them duties of candor.21 But duties of candor in contractual relationships
are nonetheless autonomy enhancing. Like liability for breach, they enable
transactions that might otherwise fail for lack of trust, thereby expanding
parties’ opportunities to engage in shared projects.
Suppose A, the owner of the bicycle, knows of a hidden defect in it.
Should A have a duty to share that information with B? Should the duties of
candor that attach at formation include, in addition to the duty not to make
false statements, duties to disclose? If more knowledge results in more
value-creating transactions, why not require contracting parties to share all
material information they have with one another?
A party-centered instrumentalist perspective suggests several
reasons.22 First, communication is not costless, either to the speaker or to
the hearer. Requiring disclosure forces parties not only to use more words,
but to undertake the costs of ensuring that those words do not mislead. And
the more information a hearer receives, the costlier it is to process it all and
sort out what matters. It is possible for the law to demand too much
information.23 Second, requiring parties to disclose valuable information
prevents them from reaping all the benefits of possessing it, thereby
reducing their incentives to acquire it. Mandating disclosure of all material
information might thereby result in a reduction of information leading to

21

See David Owens, Shaping the Normative Landscape 3-6 (2012) (describing
different senses in which an obligation can be said to be voluntary); Gregory Klass,
Promise, Agreement, Contract, in Research Handbook on Private Law Theories 39,
44-45 (H. Dagan & B. Zipursky eds., Elgar 2020) (applying Owens’s categories to
contractual obligations).
22
See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1645, 165455 (2003).
23
See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 575-80 (2006).
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mutually beneficial exchanges.24 Third are the costs of litigation and
erroneous dispute resolutions. Adding additional layers of legal liability can
raise the costs of contracting, reducing its benefits to parties.
Not every mandated disclosure reduces the gains of trade. If a party
acquires information casually, or at no cost, requiring its disclosure does
not disincentivize its production. And sometimes mandating disclosures of
a type of information incentivizes the creating of valuable data that would
not otherwise exist, such as product safety information. Like elsewhere in
the law, getting the right incentives requires finding a happy medium.25
Worries about too much information are less apposite when one party,
having balanced out the nonlegal costs and benefits of sharing information,
has chosen to speak. For this and other reasons the instrumentalist case for
liability for false statements is easier than the case for liability for
nondisclosure.26
A particularly salient piece of information is the likelihood that the
other side will breach. Because contract remedies often neither fully deter
breach nor fully compensate the nonbreaching party, a person deciding
whether to enter a transaction usually cares about the probability that the
other side will perform, including whether they currently intend to do so.
The doctrine of promissory fraud addresses that concern.27 The doctrine’s
premise is that a promise or other voluntary undertaking does more than
express an intent to undertake an obligation by the very expression of that
intent. It also implicitly represents that the promisor currently intends to

24

Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. Legal Stud. 1 (1978). The above sentences describe the tip of a large iceberg. See
also, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of
Contracts, 68 Va. L. Rev. 117, 137-42 (1982) (extending Kronman’s analysis to
argue that lying in answer to some questions during negotiation should be
nonactionable); Robert L. Birmingham, The Duty to Disclose and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma: Laidlaw v. Organ, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 249, 266-75 (1988)
(distinguishing between socially productive and privately productive information);
Robert Cooter & Tom Ulen, Law and Economics 357-59 (6th ed. 2012)
(distinguishing between productive and redistributive information); Ariel Porat &
Omri Yedlin, A Welfarist Perspetive on Lies, 91 Indiana L.J. 618, 624-33 (2016)
(extending Levmore’s analysis of information-protecting lies).
25
For an example of this balancing approach, adding in considerations of morality,
see Eisenberg, supra note 22.
26
The other reasons are manifold. For example: “The liar makes a positive
investment in manufacturing and disseminating misinformation. This investment is
completely wasted from a social standpoint, so naturally we do not reward him for
his lie.” Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 111 (2003).
27
For a detailed account and analysis of promissory fraud, see Ian Ayres & Gregory
Klass, Insincere Promises: The Law of Misrepresented Intent (2005).
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perform. That implicit representation is part of ordinary language.28 Its legal
recognition in the doctrine of promissory fraud provides parties an
important form of assurance that the proposed deal is in their interest.
Because most promisors intend to perform, most want to provide that
assurance. The implied, or default, representation backed by separate
liability in tort again serves parties’ contractual interests.29
So far I have focused on the value of information before formation,
when parties are deciding whether to agree to an exchange. This is not the
only time when sharing information can add value. The probability
performance, for example, can change, whether due to changed
circumstances or to a change of mind. After the parties have entered a
contract, new information about one side’s performance, including whether
there has been a breach, can be crucial to the other’s decisions regarding
how much more to invest in the transaction, whether to suspend their own
performance, and whether to bring an action for breach. If when entering
the exchange the parties’ goal is to maximize the contractual surplus to
divide, parties should also value the law’s help in sharing post-formation
information about the probability of performance or breach.
The importance of such information explains the rule for adequate
assurances, which provides that if one side’s performance becomes
doubtful, the other may demand adequate assurances of performance and
treat failure to give them as a repudiation.30 Here tort law can work hand in
hand with the contract rule. An express assurance of a continuing intent to
perform might be deemed adequate because the speaker thereby exposes
themselves to additional liability in tort should it be false.
The adequate assurance rule grants parties the power to sometimes
demand a post-formation assurance of performance. Absent such a
demand, the law does not impose a general duty to inform the other side of
that one has or is likely to breach. Nor does it recognize a post-formation
implied representation of a continuing intent to perform. It is an interesting
and open question why this is so. In nonlegal contexts there can be such a
duty. Suppose I have promised to pick up my friend from the airport and
something comes up that will prevent me from doing so. Obligations of
friendship require that I tell my friend that I am unlikely to perform. Why
does the law not impose a similar duty on contracting parties to share new
information about the probability of performance? Similarly, why does it

28

See, e.g., John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language
54–63 (1969) (identifying an intent to perform among the felicity conditions of
promising).
29
For an instrumentalist argument for liability in tort for promissory fraud, see Ayres
& Klass, supra note 27 at 59-82.
30
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 251.
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recognize an implied representation of an intent to perform at the time of
formation, but not after?31
Parties sometimes contract for duties to share information about
performance. A construction contract might require a certificate of
compliance, or a royalty agreement that the licensee share with the licensor
sales data. To provide effective incentives, the remedy for breach of such
duties must go beyond compensation in contract. The cost of not learning
of a breach is the inability to recover in contract for it. The nonbreaching
party’s loss, in other words, is what they would have recovered for the
undisclosed breach. If the only remedy for the informational wrong is
compensation, the breaching party risks little or nothing by attempting to
hide their breach. Either the deception succeeds, and they avoid paying for
the underlying breach, or the deception fails, and they must pay what they
would have paid anyway.32 Liability in tort, with its higher compensatory
measures and the availability of punitive damages, can solve this incentive
problem.33
The advantages of liability in tort for misrepresentations concerning
performance illustrates a broader point. The efficient breach theory starts
from the observation that both parties gain from each having the option to
breach should performance turn out to be inefficient. Parties prefer the
expectation measure because it does not prevent efficient breach, whereas
penalties or punitive damages would.34 The theory assumes, however, that
every breach is followed by a damages award that forces the breaching
31

With respect to getting the incentives right, the mitigation rule can do some of
the work. Nonrecovery of avoidable losses gives the breaching party a reason to
share information about breach. The sooner the nonbreaching party learns of the
breach, the sooner they can take steps to avoid losses. This incentive works,
however, only if there is a successful action for breach. If the breach is likely to go
undetected or be difficult to prove, the breaching party might benefit from
remaining silent about their nonperformance.
32
See Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117 Yale L.J. 2
(2007).
33
U.S. courts are divided on whether breach of a contractual duty to share
information about performance can support recovery in tort. See Jean Braucher,
Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Consumers: Consumer Protection
Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 829
(2006); Catherine Paskoff Chang, Note, Two Wrongs Can Make Two Rights: Why
Courts Should Allow Tortious Recovery for Intentional Concealment of Contract
Breach, 39 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 47 (2005); R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning
in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss Rule to Fraud and Negligent
Misrepresentation Claims, 41 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.. 1789 (2000); Steven C. Tourek,
Thomas H. Byrd & Charles J. Schoenwetter, Bucking the “Trend”: The Uniform
Commercial Code, the Economic Loss Doctrine, and Common Law Causes of
Action for Fraud and Misrepresentation, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 875 (1999).
34
For an overview of the history and limits of the efficient breach theory, see
Gregory Klass, Efficient Breach, in Philosophical Foundations of Contract Law 362
(G. Klass, G. Letsas & P. Saprai, eds., Oxford Univ. Pr. 2014).
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party to internalize the costs of breach. Misrepresentations about
performance can prevent such awards from happening. The efficient breach
theory therefore recommends deterring such misrepresentations. Nor does
the theory apply to opportunistic breaches, in which one side takes
unbargained-for advantage of the other, as opportunism reduces the gains
of trade. Fraudulent pre- and post-contractual misrepresentations are
opportunistic in this sense. In short, attaching penalties or punitive damages
to misrepresentations does not threaten efficient breach but advances the
goals of the efficient breach theory.
The above discussion can be summarized as follows. Most
contractual relationships involve a mix of trust and mistrust. By creating a
remedy for breach, contract law can address mistrust about whether
performance will happen. But parties often care about more than
performance vel non. Sharing information before and after formation can be
essential both to determining whether a proposed exchange will be
mutually beneficial and to maximizing the value it creates. Mistrust can
also prevent such information sharing. If the goals of contract law include
enabling people to engage in joint value-creating projects that would
otherwise fail for lack of trust, tort liability for pre- and post-formation
misrepresentations can be as important to its success as is legal liability for
breach. In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a contract law without it.
III.

Tortious wrongs in contractual contexts

Not all parties enter contracts from a place of mistrust. Repeat play,
reputation, and character can, individually or together, provide all the
assurances parties need to engage in joint endeavors. But such trust is
sometimes misplaced, as can be trust in legal incentives. When one party
defects from an agreement, contract law serves also to clean up the mess. In
addition to providing useful incentives ex ante, the remedies for breach do
justice ex post, by conferring on nonbreaching parties the legal power to
demand compensation for losses incurred. The same is true of the
misrepresentation torts. They not only deter wrongful behavior, creating
conditions of trust, but also provide compensation to those who suffer
losses when trust is misplaced. The principal difference between this
remedial aspect of contract and the misrepresentation torts lies in the nature
of the wrong remedied by each: defection versus deception.
With respect to this remedial function, tort liability for
misrepresentations between contracting parties is arguably nothing special.
A lie between parties to a contract is wrongful for many of the same reasons
a lie in other contexts is. The successful liar exploits and abuses another’s
trust. The liar treats the target of their deception as a means, not an end.
The liar cannot universalize the maxim of their action. Lies erode valuable
social practices of candor and trust. And so forth. All this is as true of lies in
contractual exchanges as it is of lies elsewhere. The torts of deceit and
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negligent misrepresentation applied in the contractual context address the
same types of wrongs they do elsewhere.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel illustrates. I argued above that
at the time of formation, many parties want the assurances provided by an
implied representation of an intent to perform backed by liability in tort. But
we should not lose sight of the fact that the lying promise is a wrong of a
different order than mere breach. The promisor who breaches because they
have changed their mind disappoints the other side’s expectations. The
lying promisor has manipulated the other side, tricking them into entering a
transaction that was not in their interest. That distinctive wrong also
explains the separate, higher damage measures promissory fraud can
trigger.
If the contractual context does not alter the remedial function of the
misrepresentation torts, it can make a difference in determining whether
there has been a wrong that calls for a remedy. Contract law operates
together with extralegal norms and practices to set the terms on which
parties interact, what is sometimes referred to as the “morality of the
marketplace.” Those terms interact with laws of deception in three ways.
First, the contractual context can systematically affect the meaning of what
parties say and do, and so can be crucial to identifying whether there was a
misrepresentation. Second, contracts can shift parties’ duties of candor in
ways relevant to assessing whether a misrepresentation was wrongful.
Third, laws of deception themselves help shape markets, and should
therefore be crafted to promote socially desirable marketplace norms and
contractual relationships.
The contractual context can affect the meaning of parties’ words
and actions. Consider once more time the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
The Second Restatement of Torts suggests that “a promise necessarily
carries with it the implied assertion of an intention to perform.”35 But this is
an overstatement.36 A contractual agreement that includes a nonrefundable
deposit might, depending on context, represent only an intent to perform or
forfeit the payment. And there are markets in which a contractual
undertaking to perform is generally understood to be compatible with an
intent, in a range of circumstances to, breach and pay damages.37 The
35

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530 cmt. c (1976). The Second Restatement of
Contracts provides a more nuanced rule: “[i]f it is reasonable to do so, the
promisee may properly interpret a promise as an assertion that the promisor intends
to perform the promise.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 171(2) (1981).
36
See Ayres & Klass, supra note 27 at 108-12; Gregory Klass, A Conditional Intent
to Perform, 15 Legal Theory 107 (2009).
37
Some proponents of the efficient breach theory have argued that contractual
undertakings between sophisticated parties should always be understood not as
commitments to perform, but as Holmesian commitments to perform of pay
damages. Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New
Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939, 1973–7 (2011). If that is
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contractual context is highly relevant to interpreting what a voluntary
undertaking implicitly represented, and therefore whether it misrepresented
a party’s intent.
Particular legal rules can also affect what contracting parties’ words
and actions mean. Judicial interpretation of the False Claims Act (FCA)
provides an example. Under the FCA, a contractor with the federal
government that submits “a false record or statement” material to a claim
for payment is liable for treble damages and fines.38 Since the 1990s, courts
have held that the mere act of requesting payment from the government
implicitly represents performance.39 This implied certification doctrine has
changed the meaning of asking for payment on these contracts.
Sophisticated government contractors today know that by requesting
payment they implicitly represent no breach. A similar phenomenon can be
seen in common law disclosure duties. Judicial rulings that the seller of a
residential property has a duty to disclose termites have, in effect, attached
a new implied representation to selling a home: that it is termite free. The
fact that the parties are in a contract is often essential to determining what,
from a legal point of view, they are saying, and so also whether they have
said something false.
The contractual context is also relevant to assessing the parties’
duties of candor, and so whether the law should treat a misrepresentation
or nondisclosure as wrongful. In some contexts, some deceptions are
permissible. Although an ace up the sleeve is cheating, no one blames a
poker play for bluffing. Similarly, few markets require full transparency, and
many accept some types or degrees of misrepresentation.
Thus the misrepresentation torts do not typically prohibit lying in
negotiations about one’s reservation price. Nor do they punish puffery or
sales talk.40 The law reaches these outcomes by requiring that the plaintiff’s
reliance on the misrepresentation be justifiable or reasonable.41 Market
right, an intent to perform or pay damages would not be fraudulent. To my
knowledge, no court has recognized the efficient breach theory as a defense to
promissory fraud.
38
31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
39
Ab-Tech Const., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429 (1994), aff'd sub nom. AbTech Const. v. United States, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (introducing the
implied-certification doctrine); Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579
U.S. 176 (2016) (recognizing that implied certification can be the basis for FCA
liability in some circumstances); Michael Holt and Gregory Klass, Implied
Certification under the False Claims Act, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2011).
40
Stefanie Jung argues that German law takes adopts, at least as a matter of blackletter law, a much less forgiving attitude towards such misrepresentations than does
the common law. Stefanie Jung, Bluffing in Business-to-Business Contract
Negotiations, 92 S. Cal. L. Rev. 973, 983-1000 (2019).
41
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 537 (requiring that the plaintiff’s reliance
was justifiable). But this is not all there is to these requirements. See Gergen, supra
note 15. The law also tolerates non-material misrepresentations. For an efficiency-

14

Misrepresentation (DRAFT)
participants are expected to understand the norms of the market, including
privileges to sometimes deceive. How much deception a given market
tolerates is an empirical question.42 Steven Gelber reports that in the
nineteenth century market for horses, lies were not only tolerated but
expected. “The morality—or more precisely, immorality—of horse trading
derived from the way it operated as a game. . . . Horse traders expected to
be judged by the ethics of the game.”43 Changes in the market and changes
in the law have since changed that reasonable expectation. The line
between permissible and impermissible deception has shifted.
Some have advanced deontological arguments for generic duties of
candor between contracting parties, especially with respect to disclosure.
Kim Lane Scheppele deploys a Rawlsian approach to argue that justice
demands equality in bargaining relationships, from which it follows that
there is a duty to disclose “deep secrets,” whose possible existence the
other side is fully ignorant of, as distinguished from “shallow secrets,”
whose existence the other party might suspect.44 Alan Strudler takes as his
explanandum the privilege not to disclose, and maintains that it protects
“the advantages bargainers deserve for bringing valuable information to the
bargaining table.”45 Marc Ramsay maintains that entering negotiations
allows for a degree of self-interested behavior not permissible elsewhere,
but that there is a contract-specific duty not to engage in unfair advantage
taking and that “each party is responsible for correcting reasonable, but
mistaken, beliefs about the goods [the other] brings to the bargaining
table.”46
I am skeptical of such general accounts of contractual duties of
candor. As Deborah DeMott observes with respect to mistake, “[common]
scenarios implicate more than one policy objective or expression of moral
intuition, all of them justifiable, many of them conflicting.”47 If, as DeMott
further suggests, “parties who deal at arm’s length are free to take a sporting

based explanation of that rule, see Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation:
Damages, Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1017 (2003).
42
See Edward J. Balleisen, Fraud: An American History from Barnum to Madoff 50–
54, 97–99 (2017) (discussing the historically contingent nature of what constitutes
fraud).
43
Steven M. Gelber, Horse Trading in the Age of Cars: Men in the Marketplace 15
(2008).
44
Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law
77-79 (1988).
45
Alan Strudler, Moral Complexity in the Law of Nondisclosure, 45 UCLA L. Rev.
337, 340 (1997).
46
Marc Ramsay, The Buyer/Seller Asymmetry: Corrective Justice and Material NonDisclosure, 56 U. Toronto L.J. 115, 144 (2006).
47
Deborah A. DeMott, Do You Have the Right to Remain Silent?: Duties of
Disclosure in Business Transactions, 19 Del. J. Corp. L. 65, 66 (1994).
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view of their relationship with each other,”48 the proper focus should be on
the rules of the game they are playing, rather than on generic deontological
arguments.
This is not to say that the law should not protect those who are
ignorant of the rules of the game, punish those who attempt to exploit them,
or attend to individual cases of injustice. Nor are all games of equal social
value. This brings me to my last point. Laws of deception do more than
recognize market norms. They also help shape them. For all their virtues,
markets can be sites of exploitation, discrimination, and alienation, not to
mention sources of enduring economic, social, and political inequality. Nor
are market transactions hermetically sealed from other forms of sociability:
market norms might affect how people think about their responsibilities to
one another generally. In short, not all markets are created equal. Some
markets and market norms are more socially desirable than others.49
Although courts should attend to local rules of the game regarding candor,
they should not always defer to them. the law of deception can also be
deployed to make markets better.
Conclusion
Although this chapter has treated the misrepresentation defenses
and the misrepresentation torts separately, the doctrines support one
another. As noted in Part Two, the defenses serve not only allocate the costs
of defective consent, but also to deter precontractual lies and prevent
deceivers from benefiting from their wrongs. Similarly, the deterrence
provided by the misrepresentation torts further ensures that contractual
transactions are voluntary ones. And among the reasons precontractual lies
are wrongs deserving remedies is that they subvert contract law’s goal of
enforcing only voluntary undertakings.
The distinct aspects of the misrepresentation torts identified in Parts
Two and Three—the positive incentives they create and their role in
remedying wrongs—are also interwoven. Part Two emphasized ways
information-sharing can help parties identify value-creating exchanges and
maximize the gains of trade those exchanges produce. The marketplace
norms discussed in Part Three should be evaluated in part on how well they
serve those interests. But only in part. Contract law should seek to do more
than help parties maximize gains of trade. As Hanoch Dagan and Michael
Heller emphasize,50 for example, the default and mandatory rules that
attach to specific contract types—employment agreements, franchise
48

Id. at 65.
For an argument along these lines concerning the social value of a practice of
efficient breach. Gregory Klass, The Rules of the Game and the Morality of Efficient
Breach, 29 Yale J. L. & Hum. 71, 97-109 (2017).
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relationships, consumer transactions, and so forth—also serve to guide
parties toward culturally meaningful forms of engagement that promote
autonomy in yet other ways. Those forms of engagement are likely to
include duties of candor, compliance with which the misrepresentation
torts incentivize.
This chapter has discussed only three of the ways laws of deception
advance the goals of contract law: by ensuring that contractual agreements
are sufficiently voluntary; by creating incentives that enable parties to act
together in ways that benefit both, thereby promoting party autonomy; and
by giving deceived parties the power to recover from those who have
wronged them, thereby recognizing and defining market norms. There is
more to say about the connection between contract law and the law of
deception. Regulators have sought to use mandatory disclosure, for
example, to address disparities in bargaining power and to prevent contract
law being used to systematically disadvantage groups such as consumers
and employees.51 And there is empirical evidence that contract terms
themselves can be tools of deception, as ordinary people tend to assume
unfair terms are enforceable even when they are not.52 Nor has this chapter
had much to say about how other laws of deception, such as false
advertising law or securities law, interact with the law of contract. I hope it
has said enough, however, to convince that duties of candor are as integral
to contract law as are duties to perform.
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E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 647 (2011)
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